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Admissibility of Evidence of Prior Arrests in
Louisiana Criminal Trials
The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure expressly provides four ways in which a witness' credibility may be attacked
for the purpose of impeachment. The witness' credibility may be
attacked as to the case on trial by evidence of his bias, interest,
or corruption,1 or his prior contradictory statements.2 His credibility in general may be attacked by evidence of his bad general
reputation for truth and veracity or bad general moral character 3 or by evidence of his prior convictions. 4 Prior to amendment in 1952 Article 495 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
1928, 5 which allows evidence of prior convictions, also provided
that a witness whether he be defendant or not could be compelled
to answer questions concerning his prior arrests. The amendment to this article specifically prohibited asking the witness,
whether he be defendant or not, questions concerning his prior
arrests or indictments." The purpose of this Comment is to dis1. LA. R.S. 15:492 (1950) : "Bias, interest, or corruption of witness; questions concerning particular acts
"When the purpose is to show that in the special case on trial the witness is
biased, has an interest, or has been corrupted, it is competent to question him
as to any particular fact showing or tending to show such bias, interest or corruption, and unless he distinctly admit such fact, any other witness may be examined
to establish the same."
2. Id. 15:493: "Foundation for proof of contradictory statement
"When ever the credibility of a witness is to be impeached by proof of any
statement made by him contradictory to his testimony, he must first be asked
,whether he has made such statement, and his attention must be called to the
time, place and circumstances, and to the person to whom the alleged statement
was made, in order that the witness may have an opportunity of explaining that
which is prima facie contradictory. If the witness does not distinctly admit making
such statement, evidence that he did make it is admissible."
3. Id. 15:490: "lethod of attacking credibility of witness
"The credibility of a witness may be attacked generally, by showing that his
general reputation for truth or for moral character is bad, or it may be attacked
only in so far as his credibility in the case on trial is concerned."
Id. 15:491: "General credibility; limitation of inquiry. When the general
credibility is attacked, the inquiry must be limited to general reputation, and can
not go into particular acts, vices, or courses of conduct."
4. Id. 15:495: "Impeachment by evidence of conviction; condition precedent to
proof by others; duty to answer as to indictment and arrest
"Evidence of conviction of crime, but not of arrest, indictment or prosecution,
is admissible for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the witness .... "
5. Id. 15:495: "Provided, always, that a witness, whether he be the defendant
or not, may be compelled to answer on cross-examination whether or not he has
ever been indicted or arrested and how many times." See also Oppenheim, The
Admissibility of Character Evidence For The Purpose of Impeaching Witnesses
in Criminal Prosecutions, 12 TUL. L. REV. 628 (1938).
6. La. Acts 1952, No. 180, § 1: ". . . no witness, whether he be defendant or
not, can be asked on cross-examination whether or not he has ever been indicted or
arrested, and can only be questioned as to conviction, and as provided herein."
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cuss the jurisprudence preceding this amendment and the effect
of the amendment on the admissibility of evidence of prior arrests in the light of its background and subsequent cases.
Even before Article 495 was adopted in 1928, the jurisprudence of Louisiana allowed questions on cross-examination
of the defendant concerning his prior arrests. Act 29 of 18867
provided that an accused could take the stand in his own behalf,
and he would be subject to all the rules applied to other witnesses. In State v. Murphy," decided in 1893, the accused on trial
for larceny took the stand and was asked by the prosecution
whether he had ever been arrested for stealing. The defense
objected to this question on the ground that he had not put his
character at issue, but the trial court overruled the objection.
On rehearing the Supreme Court stated:
"Counsel's argument is that the objection urged is general,
and would be equally applicable to any other witness than
the accused; his insistence here being that want of credibility
must be proved by general reputation, and not by particular
incriminating facts. That proposition is true when the evidence is offered for the purpose of impeaching the witness'
credit for veracity. Such is the purport of the authorities
cited. But in this case the trial judge had before him a person
accused of and on trial for the commission of a larceny. Accepting the grace of a special statute entitling him to be
heard as a witness in his own favor, the veracity and credibility of the witness, generally, was proper subject-matter
of investigation, because of the cloud that surrounded him,
and necessitated closer scrutiny into his veracity than that
of an ordinary witness. Being under charge of larceny, what
more damaging fact could have been elicited on the trial of
such charge than that he had been previously arrested for
similar offenses?"
Evidently this court was guided by the old policy of the law
7. La. Acts 1886, No. 29, § 2: "Be it further enacted, etc., That the circum
stance of the witness being a party accused, shall in no wise disqualify him from
testifying; provided, that no one shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; and provided, that if the person accused avails himself of this privilege, he
shall be subject to all the rules that apply to other witnesses, and may be crossexamined as to all matters concerning which he gives his testimony; and provided
further, that his failure to testify shall not be construed for or against him; but
all testimony shall be weighed and considered according to the general rules of evidence; and the trial judge shall so charge the jury."
8. 45 La. Ann.. 958, 13 So. 229 (1893).
9. Id. at 961, 13 So. at 230..
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which until 1886 had prohibited the accused from taking the
stand. The Murphy case was cited as authority in later decisions
which allowed the state to ask the accused on the stand questions
such as how many times he had been before the court, 10 how
many times he had been in trouble," and if there were any bills
of information pending against him. 1 2 In all of these cases the
Supreme Court stated that these questions were permitted only
as an attack on the credibility of the accused as a witness. The
character of the accused can be attacked only after he has offered evidence tending to show his good character. 3 When the
witness takes the stand, however, whether he has offered evidence of his good character or not, his credibility as a witness
4
is subject to the same attacks allowed on any other witness.1
Some cases decided after 1900 would indicate a move away
from the rule in the Murphy case. The court allowed the prosecution to ask the accused the question, "You went up for cutting
a man ?",'5 not on the basis of the Murphy case, but because time

spent in a penitentiary presupposes a conviction. This move
away from the Murphy case became more evident in the decision
of State v. Barrett's in 1906. The lower court allowed the ques10. State v. Callian, 109 La. 346, 347, 33 So. 363, 363 (1903) allowed the
question "How many times have you been before this court?"; did not cite the
Murphy case, but stated that since the accused answered in effect that he had
never been before the court and was not contradicted, he was not harmed.
11. State v. Casey, 110 La. 712, 713, 34 So. 746, 747 (1903) cited Murphy
case as authority for overruling the objection to the question "How many times
have you been in trouble?", The accused in this case had objected to the question
solely on the ground that it was an attempt to prove bad character when he had
not put his good character at issue. The court stated that the question was merely
to affect the credibility of the witness.
12. State v. Southern, 48 La. Ann. 628, 630, 19 So. 668, 668 (1896). The
questions asked were: "Are you charged with another offence at this time, and
are there any other bills pending against you?"; this case seems broader than the
Murphy case as in this case he was asked if there were any bills pending against
him.
13. LA. R.S. 15:480, 481 (1950).
14. La. Acts 1886, No. 29, § 2, quoted note 7 supra.
15. State v. Robinson, 52 La. Ann. 541, 547, 27 So. 129, 132 (1900). The
objection made in this case was that the question was not a fair one, as the record
was the best evidence. The court relied on a case in Michigan (Clemens v. Conrad,
19 Mich. 170 (1869)) for the proposition that such questions are allowable as
time spent in a penitentiary presupposes a conviction, therefore was proper. The
court went further to cite the Murphy case for the proposition that the record was
not necessary.
16. 117 La. 1086, 42 So. 513 (1906) (After the jurisprudence had developed
and R.S. 15:495 had been passed, the court in State v. Dumas, 168 La. 95, 121
So. 586 (1929), stated that the Barrett case was merely "obiter" and was never
followed) ; State v. Waldron, 128 La. 559, 54 So. 1009, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 809
(1911) (this case might seem to have been a return to the rule in the Murphy
case, as that case was cited; but the question here referred to time spent in a
prison and common law authorities were also cited which allowed such questions
on the ground that they presuppose a conviction).
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tion, "Have you ever been prosecuted before?", citing the Murphy case and those following it. On appeal the Supreme Court
in explaining the Murphy case and those following stated that
in all the previous cases the defense had objected to the state's
question on the ground that the character of the accused was
being attacked although he had not put it at issue. This had
been the wrong objection, stated the court, since the state's
questions had been directed to the witness' credibility, not his
character. Since the same erroneous objection had been made
in this case, the lower court's decision was affirmed. However,
the court went on to say that had the objection been directed at
the fact that the questions concerned prior arrests or prosecutions, instead of prior convictions, it would be sustained.
In 1915 a witness testifying for the prosecution was asked,
"Did you leave Mississippi because you were being charged with
murder in that state?"'17 The prosecution objected that a witness may not be questioned about prior arrests - the very objection which the Supreme Court had suggested in the Barrett
case. The trial court sustained the objection; but the Supreme
Court reversed, reasoning that the purpose of the question was
to contradict the witness' statement in his direct examination
that he had come to Louisiana to find a job. For this reason the
court stated that the validity of the objection to the question
on the ground that only prior convictions should be allowed,
because of the presumption of innocence, would not be decided.
Later in the same year this case was cited as authority for allowing a witness to be asked questions concerning an indictment
pending against him in another state.18 However, since the wit17. State v. Barnes, 136 La. 512, 513, 67 So. 349, 349 (1915). The court did
not find it necessary to cite the Murphy case as authority for overruling the
objection to the first question. However, a second question was also subjected
to: "Did you not assault a man about two months ago in the city of Shreveport
with a pistol and attempt to shoot him in the house of Carrie Davis, and were
you not prevented from doing so by bystanders?" Id. at 514, 67 So. at 350. The
court affirmed the ruling of the trial court in overruling the objection. It cited
the cases following the Murphy case, although it did not cite the Murphy case
itself. The court also stated that the second question was not objected to, as was
the first, on the ground that the witness might be compelled to incriminate himself.
18. State v. Joseph, 137 La. 53, 68 So. 211 (1915). This case stated that the
rule in the Barnes case (see note 17 supra) was that "for the purpose of discrediting a state witness who is a stranger in the community, defendant's counsel
may, on cross-examination, ask him if there is a charge of murder pending against
him in another state from which he has fled." Id. at 58, 68 So. at 212. The court
also cited those cases which followed the Murphy case; although again did not
cite the Murphy case. This case seems to be an extension of the Barnes ease, as
in this case the witness had said nothing of his reasons for coming to Louisiana
in his direct examination.
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ness had said nothing on direct examination concerning his
reasons for coming to Louisiana, it appears that the purpose
of the question was not the same as in the earlier case. The
question was permitted in this case merely to show that the witness was a fugitive from justice.
This area became even more confused in 1917 when State v.
Hughes 9 was decided. In that case the Supreme Court affirmed
a decision allowing the question, "Have you not been accused of
stealing many times?" as a test of the accused's credibility. In
support of the decision the court cited State v. Barrett20 and
State v. Waldron.21 Both of these cases would seem to be doubtful authority in support of the decision.
Finally in the case of State v. Foster2 2 the accused on the
stand was questioned on various charges of which he had been
convicted. The court allowed these questions, then stated the
general proposition that the defendant may be asked about prior
arrests, citing the line of cases which followed and relied on the
Murphy case,2 3 although it did not cite the Murphy case itself.
Until the enactment of Article 495 of the Code of Criminal Pro19. State v. Hughes, 141 La. 578, 579, 75 So. 416, 417 (1917). The court
stated in this case: "A prior conviction or prosecution necessarily implies an accusation. . . . if it is permissible to [prove the fact of] prosecution, there is no
good reason in law or logic for excluding proof of the fact of accusation." Id. at
580, 75 So. at 417.
20. See note 16 supra.
21. State v. Waldron, 128 La. 559, 560, 54 So. 1009, 1009 (1911). The question allowed in this case was: "Are you an escaped convict?" Allowing this question seems consistent with a rule which would exclude everything but prior convictions, as it implies that there had been a conviction.
22. State v. Foster, 153 La. 154, 95 So. 536 (1923).
23. Though it did not seem necessary for the decision in the case, the court
stated: "Defendant may be asked . . . if he is charged with another offense at this
time, and if other bills are pending against him." Id. at 158, 95 So. at 538. As
authority for this proposition the court cited the following: State v. Joseph, 137
La. 53, 68 So. 211 (1915); State v. Manuel, 133 La. 571, 63 So. 174 (1913)
(this case allowed a prior conviction stating that there would be no distinction
between a felony and misdemeanor in Louisiana) ; State v. Southern, 48 La. Ann.
628, 19 So. 668 (1896) ; State v. Accardo, 129 La. 666, 671, 56 So. 631, 633
(1911) (defendant was asked on cross-examination, "Ain't it a fact that they ran
you out of Baton Rouge?"; the court stated that this question was permissible, but
the case was reversed on other grounds) ; State v. Quinn, 131 La. 1090, 59 So.
913 (1912) (this case let in evidence of a conviction) ; State v. Waldron, 128 La.
559, 54 So. 1009 (1911) ; State v. Barnes, 136 La. 512, 67 So. 349 (1915);
State v. Posey, 137 La. 871, 873, 69 So. 494, 495 (1915) (questions which were
asked the defendant on cross-examination were "if he had not killed a man, in
Arkansas" and "how many men he had killed before." The objection was sustained
and the counsel for the state was reprimanded for asking them. The Supreme
Court affirmed, but stated that "evidence of the commission of other offenses is
admissible as affecting the credibility of a defendant who becomes a witness in his
own behalf") ; Id. at 873, 69 So. at 495. State v. Hughes, 141 La. 578, 75 So.
416 (1917) ; State v. Werner, 144 La. 380, 80 So. 596 (1919) (defendant was
convicted of murder. He stated on direct that he had gone into the deceased's
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cedure in subsequent cases the court cited only the Foster case
as authority for allowing questions concerning prior arrests to
attack the credibility of a witness for the purpose of impeachment.24 Article 495 stated:
"Evidence of conviction of crime, but not of arrest, indictment or prosecution, is admissible for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of a witness .... ; provided always,
that a witness, whether he be the defendant or not, may be
compelled to answer on cross-examination whether or not
'25
he has ever been indicted or arrested and how many times.
This article reflected the view taken by the minority of jurisdictions of the common law. 26 In 1952 Louisiana amended the
article to provide that a witness whether he be defendant or not
could not be asked questions concerning his prior arrests or
indictments.2 7 There have been extremely few cases decided in
Louisiana interpreting the amendment. The amendment seems
to put Louisiana more in line with the majority view of the
common law; therefore a discussion of the common law position
should prove helpful to an interpretation of the possible effect
of our amendment.
In general, the methods of attacking a witness' credibility at
common law are the same as in Louisiana.2 8 Thus in common
law jurisdictions a witness may be impeached by evidence of a
store only to rob him. The question on cross-examination was "had you not held
up another man and woman in another place of business at the point of a pistol
and robbed them?" The question was allowed as it "clearly discredited defendant's
testimony to the effect that he only intended to rob, and not to kill if he was
resisted." Id. at 386, 80 So. at 598).
24. State v. Brown, 154 La. 11, 13, 97 So. 265, 265 (1923). Defendant was
asked on cross-examination: "How many times have you been arrested?" Objection was made that only convictions could be inquired into. The objection was
overruled and State v. Foster, 153 La. 154, 95 So. 536 (1923) was given as authority. See also State v. Thompson, 161 La. 296, 108 So. 296 (1926) ; State v.
Toliver, 163 La. 1000, 113 So. 222 (1927).
25. LA. R.S. 15:495 (1950).
26. The reasons given in these jurisdictions for allowing evidence of prior
arrest are: the jury should know all the facts; the evidence in question should not
affect the parties to the litigation (this would seem not to be true when the accused has taken the stand as a witness) ; and general reputation often comes from
'biased sources. The admissibility is usually limited by the witness' privilege not'
to answer, and his answer if given cannot be contradicted. JONES, EVIDENcE § 923,
n. 3 (5th ed. 1958). See also Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1421 (1952).
27. La. Acts 1952, No. 180, § 1, quoted note 6 supra.
28. In the majority of common law jurisdictions a witness may be impeached
by evidence of general reputation for truth and veracity. 3 WIMORE, EVIDENCE
922 (3d ed. 1940). No specific acts are admissible. 3 id. §§ 924, 924b, 982, 987.
Evidence of bias or interest, prior contradictory statements, and prior convictions
are also admissible to impeach a witness. 3 id. §§ 967, 980, 1018.
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prior conviction.29 Impeachment by the showing of prior convictions may be said to be a carryover from the old common law
rule that a person convicted of crime is incompetent to testify.
Aside from this, however, there seems to be good reason for the
rule. The fact of a prior conviction would seem to be sufficient
to ground the inference that a person so convicted is less worthy
of belief than one not so convicted. If a witness has been convicted of a violation of the rules of criminal law it is deemed
proper to permit the trier of fact to consider this circumstance
in weighing his credibility. Admitting this evidence presents the
danger of an undue prejudicial effect on the mind of the trier
of fact, i.e., that too much weight will be given to the fact of
conviction. This would be true whether the witness was the accused or an ordinary witness.3 0 Possibly for this reason the
majority has excluded evidence of prior arrests,8 1 which are
clearly less indicative of untrustworthiness. Admittedly the fact
of arrest may have some relevance on the issue of a witness'
credibility, but the relevance is comparatively small and the risk
of undue prejudice rather great, particularly where the witness
is the defendant.
What is the effect of the 1952 amendment? Should it be
interpreted to exclude all evidence of prior arrests? It is clear
that where the only relevance of the arrest is to tend to show
that the witness' credibility is questionable because of the mere
fact of prior arrest the evidence should be excluded. However,
the evidence may be relevant for other reasons. In cases where
there is a strong independent relevance it would seem that Article 495 should not be held applicable. An area of the law which
might be compared to this one is the admissibility of evidence of
prior criminal conduct.3 2 Generally, evidence of prior criminal
conduct is inadmissible, but evidence which would otherwise be
admissible because of some other relevance to the issues of the
case will not be excluded merely because incidentally it tends to
show that the accused is guilty of some prior criminal conduct.
Thus it is admissible if some independent relevance is found.
29. 3 id. §§ 980, 987.
30. If the witness is the accused testifying in his own behalf, the trier of fact
may be influenced by such evidence in determining his guilt or innocence. If the
witness is an ordinary witness, the trier of fact may be unduly influenced by such
evidence and ascribe too much weight to it in evaluating the witness' testimony.
Certainly, however, the harm is greater when the witness is the accused.
31. 3 WGmoOR, EVIDENCE § 980a (3d ed. 1940); Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1421
(1951).
32. LA. R.S. 15:445, 446 (1950).
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Two cases decided since the amendment to Article 495 seem to
indicate a rule similar to that admitting evidence of prior criminal conduct will be followed in admitting evidence of prior
arrests.
The first case since the amendment in which evidence of a
prior arrest was admitted was decided in 1956. 83 The defendant
was on trial for operation of a lottery. The state introduced
papers which were taken from the lottery establishment. Allegedly the accused wrote the names of the persons who bought
lottery tickets and the number of the tickets which they bought.
The state, in attempting to prove that the records taken from
the lottery establishment were written by the defendant, was
allowed to introduce an appearance bond signed by the defendant
on a prior arrest. The state's witness was allowed to testify
that he arrested the accused and witnessed the signing of the
bond. The accused had not taken the stand nor had he offered
evidence tending to establish his good character. The accused
objected to the admissibility of the above evidence. The court
found and stressed the fact that the bond was the only known
and provable sample of the handwriting of the accused. The
court stated that the evidence was admissible as it tended "to
identify the accused as the perpetrator of the crime." This case
did not mention Article 495 but it can be reconciled with the
article as the prior arrest had an independent relevance beyond
the mere issue of credibility. It was the only known and provable
sample of the accused's handwriting.
In the only other case decided since the amendment in which
evidence of a prior arrest was admitted another independent
relevance was found. 3 4 The accused, a policeman, was convicted
of the crime of attempted public bribery. The defense counsel
was not allowed to bring out the fact that a witness for the state
had been arrested and indicted with the defendant as an accomplice in a burglary. The defense counsel's purpose was to show
that since the witness had not yet been brought to trial, his
testimony might well be affected by a promise of leniency from
the state. The Supreme Court ordered a new trial, holding that
the defense counsel should be permitted to bring out facts relative to the bias or interest of the witness. The court stressed
the fact that the state's witness had been an alleged accomplice
33. State v. Reinhardt, 229 La. 673, 86 So.2d 530 (1956).
34. State v. Lewis, 108 So.2d 93 (La. 1959).
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of the defendant and emphasized the rule that generally great
latitude is allowed the defendant in cross-examination of an accomplice who is testifying for the state. It is probable that this
same result would have been reached in the majority of common
3 5

law jurisdictions.

Although there has been no case in point since the amendment, there is at least one more situation in which questions
concerning prior arrests of the defendant may be held to be
admissible as having an independent relevance. On cross-examination of the defendant's character witness the state is allowed to ask questions to challenge the knowledge which the
character witness has of the defendant's reputation and also to
show the standards with which the witness judged the reputation. Prior to 1952, to accomplish these objectives the state was
allowed to ask the witness if he had ever heard of a prior arrest
of the defendant.3 6 Although apparently there is no case on the
point, it would seem that the same rules would apply if the witness were testifying not as to the character of the defendant
but to his reputation as to credibility. Thus if a witness' credibility has been attacked by witnesses testifying to reputation
and he calls another witness to support his reputation in this
regard, the supporting witness may be asked if he has ever
heard of a prior arrest of the defendant. The leading case in
common law in this area is Michelson v. United States.37 The
state was allowed in this case to ask the defendant's character
witness if he had heard that the defendant had been arrested.
The court stated, however, that regardless of the legal explanations for allowing this testimony, the prior arrest of a defendant
is brought to the attention of the triers of fact. This fact may
lead to a conviction of the accused because of his prior arrests;
and although the character witness may deny having heard of
35. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 967, 949 (3d ed. 1940).
36. State v. Oteri, 128 La. 939, 55 So. 582 (1911) (defendant's character witness was asked: "Have you heard that the defendant has been arrested?") ; State
v. Thornhill, 188 La. 762, 178 So. 343 (1937) (allowed asking defendant's character witness questions concerning particular facts in order to test the soundness
of his opinion) ; State v. Jacobs, 195 La. 281, 196 So. 347 (1940) (allowed the
question: "Did you know that he [defendant] was arrested in Shreveport for hot
checks?"; notice that the common law jurisdictions allow only "Have you heard";
in this case the Louisiana court allowed "Do you know," which seems contrary to
the theory underlying this line of inquiry) ; State v. Powell, 213 La. 811, 35 So.2d
741 (1948) (allowed the question: "Did you hear that the defendant had been
arrested, charged, and indicted. .. ?").
37. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948). See also Annot., 47
A.L.R.2d 1258 (1956) ; 3 WIGMOEE, EVIDENCE § 988 (3d ed. 1940).
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the prior arrests and the opposing counsel is bound by his answer, the innuendo of an actual arrest has been suggested in
the mind of the trier of fact. The defendant is protected only by
the fact that he alone can introduce the issue of his good character; if he does not do this, he will be immune from the possible
prejudice that might result from the line of questioning permitted in the Michelson case.
As previously discussed, the only case citing the 1952 amendment to Article 495 and holding it not to apply was the case in
which a prior arrest and indictment was offered to prove bias
or interest. The case which allowed evidence of a prior arrest
to prove identification of the accused's handwriting may in the
future be limited to its facts in view of the court's stressing
that the appearance bond was the only known and provable
sample of the accused's handwriting. Finally, an independent
relevance probably will be found where the question is designed
to test the character witness' knowledge of reputation. While
there may be other instances in which evidence of prior arrests
will be allowed, in view of the risk of undue prejudice it is submitted that such evidence should be admitted only when there is
a strong independent relevance.
C. A. King, II

